Obstacles to Unity
Until the last decade of the twentieth century, there seemed to be little evidence of a common integrated Europe, though this had been an omnipresent goal since the end of World War Two. Many of the obstacles had to do with differences in political agendas. The polarizing suspicion � and reality � of attempts at global hegemony and domination by each of the two superpowers, America and the USSR, colored European relations and aided in the estrangement of populations during the Cold War and afterwards. Even within each sphere of influence, there were problems with unity. In Western Europe, the internal political agendas of nations frequently got in the way of proposals and partnerships for the common good. The Communist satellite states encountered increasing degrees of friction with the USSR as they attempted to apply socialism in their own countries; by the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, many of the Eastern European nations were still floundering for adequate governance. However, most of these obstacles were overcome by the 1990s, a decade which saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reuniting of Germany, the founding of the European Union and growing stability after the fall of Communism.
The Cold War, which had started around the end of the Second World War, paralyzed the Western collective conscience in its symbolic battle of good vs. evil. The forces of democracy, and to a lesser extent, of monarchy, attempted to halt the spread of virulent Communism, and the Russian behemoth attempted to return the favor. By the Seventies, as the age of d�tente and perestroika began, there was a general relaxation of the strict separations invoked during the Cold War. However, the ever-present doubt within both governments of the good intentions of the other provoked a continuous vacillation in position. The unreliability of superpower foreign policy � particularly American reversals from d�tente to containment and back again � frustrated much of Western Europe, which had already suffered losses in influence due to the already overriding importance of the war against Soviet expansion. Catastrophes like the Vietnam War not only outraged European opinion, but it led to a general questioning of the Truman Doctrine and the good intentions of democracy; many Europeans had come to accept the need for post-Atlanticism � an independent Europe without America.
Indeed, many had lost the respect for the American model of freedom through
democracy. Also, Communism was beginning to lose its negative image with the relative success of destalinization and Eurocommunism within Western Europe. Increasingly, the new political aims of the younger generation were beginning to come through in shows of terrorism and violent revolution all over Western and Eastern Europe. The world did not seem to be such a dangerous place any more. The theologies of communism and liberalism could no longer unify entire populations; in fact, it was only the excess action of some of these revolutionary groups that prevented general acceptance of the revolutionist�s modifications to political life, as in Italy, Germany, Spain and Northern Ireland. After all, dedication to either system had not prevented the economic disasters that had characterized the Seventies: the energy crisis, ever-increasing inflation and extremely high unemployment. Thus, the wandering intellectual atmosphere became a great barrier to the effectiveness of European integration.
When the Communist system finally started to lose its stranglehold on its contiguous identity, many of the Eastern European satellites encountered problems of their own in trying to establish their own national presence amidst crises in ideology and power politics. D�tente and perestroika allowed for a legal re-evaluation of Communist theory; this not only allowed the republics breathing room when deciding policy, but an atmosphere where political discussion could be maintained at a dangerously high level. This began to erode the stability of rule from afar, especially after the introduction of De-Stailinization, which was the first occurrence of the party recanting its own line. In places like Poland, the additional political and national pride in maintaining separate Communist ideologies increased tensions by being overly oppressive without the full backing of the central state apparatus. The main problem was that the entire structure had failed to promote the idea of one unified, multicultural state to its populations. Aggravated nationalistic tendencies, combined with such an accommodating atmosphere for political dissension, meant that calls for freedom and independence would only increase � which they did, in often violent ways. The Prague Spring marked a defining moment in the clash of freedom and Russian authority; though it failed, it both outraged the world and members of the Communist movement, allowing for splintering and disunity among the ranks. Into the late 1980�s, Russia showed great evidence of a collapse in command: violent religious outbursts and independence movements in the satellite states could not be stopped, and it was only a matter of time before these states would break away, striking one more blow at European unity.
In order to salvage Western Europe from �Eurosclerosis� or permanent economic decline, various political leaders lobbied for the creation of a true common market within the confines of the European Economic Commission, which had been in place since 1957. Though a �common market� had existed on some level since 1957, there was a general disunity in action, promoted by national pride. The reduction and elimination of tariffs, the abolishment of banking and taxation systems, as well as the creation of a common currency worried many, most notably Kohl in Germany and Thatcher in Britain. Britain itself, as a major economic power important to the success of the EEC, had not been a member until 1973. France, worried about British challenges to French sovereignty within Europe, had continually vetoed Britain�s inclusion into an organization that was attempting to truly integrate Europe and provide a better fate for each of the countries involved. More aggravatingly, differences in agricultural and cultural standards and production had made alignment of common economic goals extremely difficult. The process toward actual integration didn�t start until fears of an imminent European decline were publicized in the mid-1980�s, giving willing politicians the political leverage in which to totally rework existing trade and taxation systems to specifications. Under the Single European Act finally ratified in 1987, a fully �common market� would be instituted by 1992.
These obstacles, though destructive to general European integration, were overcome in the 1990s by political reconciliation. The vacillations of American and Russian superpower hegemony became much less dangerous to European stability as events like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of liberal and communist Germany allowed the public to see that the superpowers could agree upon a greater good. Also, renewed American support for liberalism and the independence movements growing across Europe as well as continued maintenance of �neutralism� in Germany did much to improve the position of the US in the eyes of the visionaries leading political currents in Europe. With the coming advent of the European Union�s common market in 1992 and the American willingness to adapt and learn the new economic models, the success and acceptance of the new economic system was ensured, and another obstacle to integration surmounted. Finally, the continuous clash of liberalism and communism was dissipated by the collapse of the USSR and degeneration into Russia and the independent satellite states. The difficult transition period for Eastern Europe was overcome by successful examples of nationalization in other nations and broad support overseas for the stubborn independence movements that were able to remove dictators and oppressive governments, like Romania�s Ceausescu. Across Europe, integration became easier because of the similarity in problems faced; most countries were more or less liberalizing rule. Even though problems continue to plague European nations, they tend to be more individualized, as the greater trend is toward greater cooperation within Europe, as shown by the expansion of the European Union this year and greater involvement in NATO and other cooperative agencies.