European Politics, 1914-2004
In Flanders Field and the poems of Sir Wilfrid Owen both glorify the First World War and the idea of absolute sacrifice. The slogan dolce et decorum est was invoked many times during and after that war to indoctrinate to the soldiers and population that it was sweet, and proper, to die for your country. The First World War, however, was the first entirely devastating example of total war, where the fighting involved killing innocents and total destruction; where diplomacy was not used to end wars but to continue it; where so much was spent that the entire balance of power shifted from Europe to the Americas.
Von Clausewitz once stated that �war is a continuation of politics by other means.� Pro-war and pro-military types usually quote him, but they forget that he was also referring to the fact that the larger political goals should never be lost. In World War I, politics followed the war rather than by Clausewitz�s dicta. It was impossible to negotiate without one side winning, because the war had pitted civilization against civilization and raised the level of community involvement in the war effort. In order to keep fighting, the government had to remind the people continually of the war�s importance and the fact that they would not bargain away what the people thought they had worked hard for, and died for. They could not end the war by diplomacy, as that would give away this moral stance they had taken � but it did not matter, in the end, because the war destroyed the society they thought they were defending. It was an expensive war; in 1920, it was estimated that 338 billion dollars had been spent on the First World War, and their dollar was worth 10 modern dollars.
The First War began in 1914 after the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne by Serbian nationalists. Due to the extensive system of alliances, Germany joined Austro-Hungary, and Russia, Britain and France allied together. Thus began the first general war in 99 years. Diplomacy was pushed aside and war quickly declared, where it hadn�t been pursued during snafus in Morocco, the Balkans and again in Bosnia. The reason? Complicated war plans took precedent over political discussion. Russia mobilized to threaten Austro-Hungary, but this indirectly threatened Germany. Also, because of incomplete war planning, they could only enable complete mobilization and nothing in between, so the full mobilization inspired Germany to do the same. Germany quickly came up with the Schlieffen Plan, as set up by Count Alfred von Schlieffen. They had to face the possibility of a two front war against France and Russia. Their plan was to fight France first during the 2 months it would take Russia to reach the borders; it would be as easy as it had been during the Franco-Prussian War, they thought. As France massed its troops on the German borders, the plan was to sweep through the low countries with most of their forces and force France to surrender. There was a diplomatic problem, though, for Prussia had signed an agreement in 1839 to respect Belgium�s neutrality.
The German Kaiser had reservations about getting into the war in the West as well as the East, but Moltke and the other generals told him there was no other way. It quickly progressed to a large war, but the generals announced that it would be a short war because of the military technology that they had. The one problem? Technology makes the war longer, and not because it can kill more efficiently. Better food production makes countries last longer, and gives them time to rebuild defenses and continue mass production. Also, the other side had new technology, like barbed wire and machine guns. The one artifact they had not discarded was the use of cavalry. After the military saw their uselessness in wars against men with guns, they were withdrawn from use and sometimes used as feed for the soldiers.
During the sweep up from the low countries, the German got quickly bogged down, as the scale of attack had been decreased from its original conception, and fierce counterattacks slowed movement. At the Battle of the Marne, during November 1914, the French and the British stood up against the onslaught and dug frontlines that stayed similar throughout the next four years. Great battles were pitched over that time for mere yards. The September Program was a German offer to end the war under the condition that they be allowed a permanent occupation of Belgium, the coal fields of Lorraine, large economic expansion over Europe, and other obviously unreasonable requests that were quickly rejected.
During this time of uncertainty, the Allies and the German-Austrian alliance sought supporters from among the countries not yet involved in the war. Italy was willing to join in, if they were given Trieste and the Croatian coast on the Adriatic, which was part of Austro-Hungary at the time. The Germans would not give it, so the British and the French promised the Italians that boon and so Italy became one of the Allies and joined the war under the Treaty of London. It was secret: for the British proclaimed a belief in self-determination, yet the treaty traded away Slovak land in favor of Italian interests. Romania joined the Allies as well after they were promised Transylvania. Germany, on the other hand, courted Turkey successfully due to the efficiency of the German Navy in getting into Turkey, and the ever present Russian threat to Turkish security. They were also successful in getting Bulgaria to join by promising them Macedonia. They did not seek much help from the Middle East, as colonization had taken over much of it. In a 1916 secret treaty, the British and French split up the Middle East for themselves. However, they were able to buy more support for the war by supporting a Jewish homeland in the Middle East. The most obvious proof of the death of peace diplomacy was seen when Emperor Charles, the successor to Emperor Franz Joseph in Austro-Hungary, attempted to negotiate a separate peace with Britain. The British, instead of welcoming his proposal, refused the offer and exposed him for trying; as this was done without Germany�s knowledge, it was very embarrassing for the emperor.
The war saw a collapse of political authority and responsibility � it ushered in a new period of revolutionary upheaval and violence. A 1917 mutiny in the French army rendered it incapable of fighting; it was put down brutally. Thankfully, the Germans had been busy with the Russian front. At the same time, a new government in Germany was being organized, and a new secular state had been established in Turkey. One of the Turkish government�s more offensive projects was the genocide of the Armenian population. This was the first breakdown of political mores in a long time. Even Hitler admired the situation, as he often asked if anyone talked about the Armenians when he was criticized for his version of genocide. The failure of the European states to end the war weakened the European international system, devastated industries and the populace, and removed the �center of the world� designation, for they couldn�t control their international affairs. In 1954, Taylor observed that the war had allowed Bolshevism and American liberal democracy to rise as global spheres of influence rather than western Europe; and that they would eventually clash.
In Russia itself, though German propaganda screamed of the Russian Colossus, things only had the impression of being strong, like a Potemkin village. Really, it hadn�t recovered from its loss during the Russo-Japanese War. Tsar Nicholas, a weak ruler, would not change his position even though it was politically advisable � he had a strong focus on maintaining the autocratic powers to be passed on to his son. To remove the heat from himself, he joined in the war. At Tannenberg in September of 1914, a large Russian army contingent was crushed by a small German force; even though it was a huge loss, Russia was able to stay in the war because of the bungling of the Austro-Hungarian army and the various battles distracting military planners. Even though the monarchy pursued this course to make the people happy, it really just undermined support for the monarchy. As food prices skyrocketed because of low production, bread riots broke out across Russia during the spring of 1917; afterwards, Tsar Nicholas abandoned his throne to the provisional government, who were supposedly going to rally troops to finish the war, and then modernize the country.
Alexander Kerensky was the leader of the provisional government, and he was elected by promises that Russia would be assisted by the West, as promised by the Allies. However, the Allies demanded that Russia stay in the war. This was unpopular and offered an unhappy paradox: the Allies supported democracy, but they refused to help unless Russia violate democracy and stay in the war against its people�s wishes. The German government observed this and wanted to offer an alternative government that would quickly end the war. German agents approached Lenin and arranged for him to be transported back into Russia. Though they opposed Bolshevism, they knew that the Bolsheviks would end the war fast, as they saw it as a capitalist war. Lenin�s train was sealed for the trip, as if it were a teeming �jar of revolution.� Lenin rapidly won over the people, as his proclamations of peace, bread and land resounded better than Kerensky�s complicated explanations of political realities.
Soviets grew in number all over Russia until the time came for the Bolsheviks to take control as the organization behind the Soviets. As they grabbed power, they showed that they didn�t care about the war, as they started immediate peace negotiations with Germany and published all the war treaties so as to embarrass the Allies. This gave Russia time to consolidate power and promote their World Revolution. After all, once a world revolution rolled around, their treaty would mean nothing. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed in March 1918 and granted Germany land in Russia plus indemnities in return for peace. This would have been the perfect opportunity for Germany to concentrate on the Western Front, but it was too busy claiming its new land in the East. The growth of Bolshevism and their retreat scared the European nations, as they feared the revolutionary spirit that followed no rules but the ones they made up. Most of all, they feared being overthrown by revolutionaries themselves.
By 1914, the United States government had become involved in Latin America and Asia but not very much in Europe at all, though they certainly identified with Europeans. American universities emulated Oxford, Cambridge and the rigorous German research universities. Upper class Americans aspired to the European look; the Great Gatsby is a great illustration, as is Hemingway�s involvement with the bohemians in Paris. Woodrow Wilson, however, preferred to be perfectly neutral and not get involved with Europe, and he transferred this feeling to the country.
The United States declared its neutrality and announced that their shipping should not be tampered with, or American civilians on the ships of belligerents. This didn�t exactly work, as trade blockades prevented the reasons for shipping in the first place. The Germans started out respecting neutrality and requesting passengers get off the boat before they would sink the shipping vessels, but this would only work if the boat was unarmed and by itself. The British began putting guns on merchant vessels, as one shot could sink a sub. In desperation, the Germans developed torpedoes and announced unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915. The British still encouraged Americas to travel on British ships; British ads in American papers supported travel, while the Germans advised Americans not to travel. When the Lusitania was sunk by German U-boats.in May 1915, citizens became angry over the death of 200 Americans in the destruction.
This caused big problems for Germany: the US requested that Germany respect their neutral rights, but Germany refused, citing the nationality of the vessel. William Jennings Bryan, as Secretary of State, resigned because he felt Wilson was being too belligerent. The joke was on him, as Wilson was re-elected in 1916 for �keeping us out of war.� The United States was clearly in the European orbit, since it only traded with the Allies, and they were giving up all their gold for US supplies. Eventually, the US became the largest creditor in the world. Wilson used this power as leverage. He felt he could mediate, but his efforts didn�t work. Americans began calling for participation in the war, and Wilson was tempted to join the war. It was after a second unleashing of submarine warfare in spring 1917, and the subsequent German approach to Mexico for military support that the US was persuaded to enter the war. Mexico had been promised California; and this was open for the world to see when British intelligence released the Zimmerman telegram to US papers.
In April 1917, the US entered the war on the side of the Allies to �preserve democracy.� Wilson, to generate enough public approval, portrayed the United States as Europe�s savior from its old ways. The goal was to create a new world, or �to make the world safe for democracy.� To separate the US from Europe, he released his Fourteen Points; this document looked rather like Wilson was attempting to set up a world order in democracy. By the time the war was over, Wilson was pushing the creation of the League of Nations, which came together in a mostly nominal fashion. It was only important in the fact that Wilson, whom the European leaders relied upon, was strongly supporting the organization as a centerpiece for peace, but it did not affect discussions seriously, except as a bargaining chip.
The Paris Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty formally ended the war in 1919, including reparations and land settlements. However, the old diplomacy that had been practiced � that did not refer to the wishes of the populations concerned, and did not constantly work on maintaining the balance of power � was anathema to Wilson; he did not like secret diplomacy, and preferred an �open diplomacy�. He also seemed to support national self-determination of each set of peoples apart from the predation of powerful neighbors. This actually stemmed from his faith in popular sovereignty. His principles were important because he was personally involved in the discussions, and his money was keeping their governments afloat. It was hard for him to use this weapon, because it would have alienated the Allied populations, and Kissinger�s �linkage,� or imposition of financial penalties as retaliation, was never used, although there were frequent bitter disputes.
Wilson thought the peoples of Europe would wholly embrace his plan, and he saw Lloyd George and Clemenceau�s recalcitrance as vindictive, but the reality was that they were acting on the fear of domestic revolt if they were lenient towards the defeated powers. He soon saw that allowing for an openly arrived peace would lean to settlements that preferred vengeance, so he was led to discard open diplomacy during the sessions of the Council of Four. What made the Paris Peace Conference leave negative opinions on history was the violation of both of Wilson�s honored precepts. The Treaty, when it was finished, forced Germany to relinquish certain acquired lands and its colonies, as well as limit their army and equipment. Economically, they required high reparations � of approximately $33 billion dollars as well as a reduction of its industry that severely crippled Germany�s economy. Besides having to deliver coal to surrounding nations, Germany had to hand over control of the Saar area which was rich in resources. Even more offending was the prohibition of German national self-determination.
Not only was it seen as harsh by the Germans, but Americans noted its bitter qualities. Keynes wrote a rejection of the treaty based on a caricature of Wilson � the buffoon outwitted by the crafty Europeans � and Dulles/Baruch drafted a reply that made little impact. It played a large role in the senatorial rejection of the treaty in spring 1920. However, Ray Stannard Baker, American press chief at the conference, wrote an effective defense that was a bestseller. In effect, the punishments were not going to the wealthy aristocrats who were the power brokers, but to the survivors who had been bled white and their societies broken down completely. The land settlement were not done with national self-determination in mind, mainly because the disputed territories would all have fallen in favor of the British by percentage of population in the area. It was a little better in moral terms, as there was no war-guilt clause inserted in the treaty, though it was universally accepted that Germany was to blame. It probably would have been wiser to set a moderate level of reparations, that would not have bred and stimulated the xenophobia that Hitler was able to take advantage of. Also, it is easy to see just Germany suffering, but other nations suffered as well � colonial redistribution and settlements stayed just as harsh and intolerant as before, for European ideas were still distinctly racist. In particular, the Allies were keen on checking Bolshevism, by creating and assisting in the reconstruction of barrier states between Russia and Western Europe.
NOTES MISSING
After the war, the French were suffering from severe financial and technical problems due to their war debt and lower level of industrial development as compared to the Germans, even before the war. Thus, they desired to occupy the Ruhr, the premier industrial area in Germany. Poincare, the French prime minister elected in 1923 after Clemenceau, supported this move largely because of his nationalist tendencies and prominent anti-German feelings. Though the Allies weren�t too keen on extending military occupation and the German population would naturally be angered by the idea, the French felt the benefits outweighed the negatives. So, the French were forced to do it alone.
The Weimar Republic ruled Germany after the war and bore the responsibility of rebuilding the country and the economy, though they were unfairly blamed for the war, as their representatives had signed the peace treaties. Many Germans were not happy about the peace; Rathenau, the foreign minister who had signed the peace treaty, was murdered in the street by an angry nationalist. Moreover, the reparations had been settled at around the equivalent of 31 billion dollars in marks; no one believed that the government could pay the cost without crippling the country. To start rebuilding and attempting to pay the costs would require all their available industrial output, and so the Ruhr came to be a very important piece of land � the French ambitions were not well met, and increasing violence disrupted governance within Germany.
In 1923, a putsch in Bavaria was engineered by the young corporal Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists. It failed, but it was able to pass along the message. The French had occupied most of the Ruhr, but they didn�t push their other territorial aims and other issues relating to the repayment of reparations. Germany itself also pulled back from its threats to prevent another war, and the Republic was able to survive for a few more years. During these years, Stresemann, the German foreign minister; Briand, the French foreign minister; and Chamberlain, the British foreign minister were able to arrange a stable peace as well as the extension of credit to Germany by US banks. The Dawes Plan, as it was called, was arranged with firms like J.P. Morgan along with the blessing of the United States government, in order to address the rebuilding of the economic structure and repayment of debts. The Young Plan, released not much later, reorganized the reductions and payments so that Germany would pay yearly amounts until 1988. It was extremely lucky to have three conservatives maintaining the peace and arranging stabilization for Western Europe, as no one wanted to see these countries plunged into chaos yet again.
Stresemann followed a policy of fulfillment to lull the allies into ignoring the military cooperation with Russia, helping readjust Eastern borders in their favor, and turn a blind eye to the rebuilding of the �black� and illegally large Reichswehr. A high officer ratio was maintained with the retaining of previously demobilized soldiers, in order to have a skeleton crew for a future-super army. Germans were happy to have a foreign minister who was able to do all this for them and more, even if it meant beginning to fulfill all the Versailles treaty demands. In 1925, Germany signed the Treaty of Locarno, agreeing that its Western borders were permanent, meaning Alsace-Lorraine would stay French and the Rhineland would stay demilitarized. In return, Stresemann was able to get the Western forces to move the withdrawal date from Germany to 1930 rather than 1939. By 1926, he was able to get Germany into the League of Nations which it had been banned from. For this, he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Secretly, he supported an expansion into Eastern Europe and a takeover of the Polish corridor, just as Hitler was to aspire for in his term of rule.
During Stresemann�s tenure, Hindenburg had been elected into office. He had been Supreme Commander during World War I, and his position seemed to put some credibility into the Republic, but Hindenburg was growing senile. To make things worse, Stresemann died of a heart attack in October of 1929, the month of the New York Stock Exchange collapse and the beginning of the Great Depression. Though economic troubles were always going to come, the one practical leader of the country had died, and this became a breeding ground for resentment. Economic problems were easily blamed on people that one didn�t like, and this began to amount to xenophobia and distrust within the country. Stabilization efforts were stopped for good, as the unavailability of credit on either side of the Atlantic meant no one was getting paid. The collapse of the Rothschild�s Credit Anstalt in Vienna prompted a mass of bankruptcies and financial woes within Western Europe as well as in the smaller countries that had blossomed out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These countries were mainly agricultural and relied on food purchases, which other countries could not do without the credit. Also, non-stable politics disarmed efforts everywhere.
Authoritarian regimes tended to get set up at this point. Democracy was inefficient and couldn�t solve Europe�s economic problems fast enough, so diplomacy was reduced, cooperation was lessened and trade barriers were erected. 1929 to 1933 were to be the worst years of the depression as well as a great blow to the authority of the democratic states by the failure of the representational institution. In Russia, it was different. As Russia was so far behind, the Depression didn�t really affect it at all, and much business came into Russia after that. One good thing about the Depression, however, was its erasure of the reparation debt under a moratorium and subsequent annulment by Hoover. People figured that no one would be able to pay, and thus reparations would be useless.
In 1931, half-hearted disarmament negotiations began. No country was very serious about the matter, and the target of the negotiations, Germany, was filled with angry people who felt that they had already been forcibly disarmed and were waiting for the world to take the rest of the cache from them. Hitler would exploit these feelings and was finally able to engineer the political situation such that the Nazis were on the rise by 1933. To the world, the transfer of power was uneventful, as he was just another thug who wouldn�t last very long. As far as propaganda went, the German won points for presenting the Versailles treaty as old because it continued to require that Germany would be held down and stated that the war was the German�s fault in so many words. German historians worked feverishly to produce a book that presented one kind of historical revisionism. Suddenly, the war was the whole world�s fault; that it was probably just a pointless exercise that nobody wanted but just came. Strangely enough, American historians began to adapt this voice. They seemed to turn against the positive involvement in the war, and they too criticized Versailles as being too harsh and a bad way of dealing with things.
When Hitler�s National Socialist party took over control of the German government post-Stresemann and post-Locarno, they never made secret their support of Mein Kampf. Their platform included much of his racial politics and his disapproval of Versailles � but the voters and other members of the populations never expected them to come to power so quickly and implement all their platform promises. They were in power by 1933, though they ruled in a coalition that they whittled down slowly. They had the largest voting bloc behind them, though they weren�t majority. Even the outside world didn�t expect it, or didn�t see any importance in his election to chancellor. He was a funny man, given to vitriolic speeches, and besides finding him a ridiculous candidate, the number of chancellors in office was large, and no one expected him to last.
Hitler was smart and concluded many ambitious programs within his tenure. He quickly sent Vice-Chancellor Papen to Rome to sign a Concordat with the Pope, legitimizing the Catholic Church�s place in Germany where other German governments had waffled, leading German Catholics to throw their support on him. This had the effect of solidifying his political authority and moral basis early on. So, in April 1933, when he supported the one-day boycott of Jewish businesses in Berlin, nobody said much, probably for fear of retaliation by his fierce Gestapo. He also broke down power in Austria by prohibiting German travel to Austria and supporting the Nazi party within Austria, making the way for his arrival there during the beginning of World War II. He was very cautious in this support; after a failed coup that ended with the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, he was able to watch the world�s reaction. The international community was disgusted, and Mussolini showed his anti-Nazi position by mobilizing the Italian army.
One of Hitler�s first acts was to test the limits of League of Nations control over Germany. He complained about army size as limited by the Versailles treaty; he followed up with the demand that Europe disarm like Germany was required to or have Germany reserve the right to rebuild. The League of Nations could only tell them not to do it again. Since their inception, the League had been weak; their first failure came after Japan invaded Manchuria and made it a protectorate in 1931. In that year too, they could do nothing - because no one knew exactly how to implement an international response to aggression by any nation, much less a member nation. Hitler finally took a strong stance when he declared in 1935 that Germany was no longer bound by the military clauses of the Versailles treaty. In this declaration, he also announced his plans for increasing the size of the German Army and introducing general conscription. Mussolini, already feeling threatened, quickly reached an agreement with the worried French to concerted attack in case of German military action. At Stresa, Britain, France and Italy declared their support of Austrian independence and fully condemned Germany�s aggressions and violation of the Versailles treaty. Also, they threatened to back their statements up with counterattack. Then, strangely enough, Britain signed a naval agreement with Germany allowing the Germans to increase its navy from 0 to the same number as Britain had � it was confusing all around, as it offered nothing but disadvantage to British interests. The idea was that if the world was to treat Germans with respect, Germany would soon act like a respectful nation. Idealism of this nature never really works, as history shows.
In March 1936, Germany announced the end of the demilitarization of the Rhineland. German troops marched back into the area, violating both the Versailles treaty and the Locarno pact. Indeed, this was a big step, but it was in a gray area, as Germany pointed out that it was only taking back what it had owned. Technically, the close presence of French and Belgian troops should have meant a fulfillment of the Locarno pact and an attack on Germany�s troops for its indiscretion, but nobody wanted to stop them. No one wanted to move first, as they would be labeled the bad guy � and with this inaction, Germany emerged victorious, with the world accepting its new position nervously. There was little backlash, for that same year, the world came to celebrate in Berlin with the Olympics. It has been said that this was a triumph for race, as the achievements of Jesse Owens during the Olympics should have meant something. But in reality, it didn�t. US papers reported only on the cleanliness of German cities, and not on the wins of Jesse Owens or the passage of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which deprived Jews of citizenship and forced upon them yellow Stars of David among other discriminations.
The debate over Hitler�s motivations range from the intentionalist to the structuralist arguments. Intentionalism relates to the development of an ideological programme based on certain goals, which are usually present since before the implementation. Structuralism refers to the usage of opportunity; or improvising with the factors at hand. It is well described as a philosophy-on-the-fly. If we could pinpoint his motivations, it is thought, we can ascertain if there was a possibility of stopping him: intentionalism would allow that, whereas structuralism would not.
With Hitler�s aggressive foreign policy, Mussolini was finally convinced that it would be better to side with Hitler, as he could be �paid� faster. In 1936, Mussolini staged an attack of Ethiopia to gain what he felt the Allies could never provide: an empire, like in Rome. As a young journalist, he had witnessed the first attempt of the Italians in defeating Ethiopia, and saw its utter failure; he was intent on winning it this time around. Again, the League of Nations could provide little in the way of policing, even with Ethiopia as a member nation. Italy saw this as a triumph, using terror bombing, poison gas and other crimes against humanity to win over an African nation. The sad part of this was that nobody felt the destruction to be as important as a preservation of the peace within Western Europe.
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During the late 1930�s, it was obvious to the major powers that Germany was throwing off its shackles to be involved in society again. France, knowing this time was coming, had been pursuing a defensive policy with its military by constructing fixed defenses and elaborate fortifications along much of the German border. The idea was that they would soon have to refight World War I, where fixed positions had been a good idea � but unfortunately, developing technology had made it useless. Thus, the Maginot Line came to be proverbial for the futility of the static defense system worldwide. France also saw that the League of Nations could not ensure protection, and sought allies. Poland had already signed a 1933 pact with Germany, and France couldn�t afford involvement with Russia; so they turned to the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. These countries were willing to come into an alliance as they owed their existence to the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, they wished the breakup to stay that way. However, the alliance was in reality useless, as the Little Entente had little military value, and travel routes had to go thru Germany to wherever needed help.
Britain treated this situation differently: they wanted to co-opt Germany and followed a policy of appeasement. Under this philosophy, leaders like Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Dawson thought that giving in to the Germans would prevent them from being war-like Their other reasoning said that Nazi Germany, for all its faults, would be an active bulwark against communism. In any case, they ignored domestic atrocities, as they had their own trouble spot to manage: Northern Ireland. Many within Britain felt that it was unrealistic and dangerous to try and overthrow the German government during this period of recovery. Churchill argued that this was a good idea; he likened appeasement to feeding an alligator with all of your friends so as to be eaten last. He was declared a warmonger and reviled for this.
Germany had the initiative, as Britain and France were busy with their own differences. Germany was still somewhat like other European states, as they had definable goals; the irrationality of these goals made them suspect. Hitler was still busy with planning his goals (though he was also an opportunist at the same time). In November of 1937, he called a conference at which he outlined his long term goals to all the high-ranking Germans within his government. The Hossbach Protocol � or notes from the conference � later became evidence that Hitler was mainly responsible for warmongering. The next year, Hitler began pushing out many of the old-school ministers in the government, perhaps making it easier to pursue his foreign policy. He was casting his eye on Austria, who had a strong Nazi presence and was friendly to the idea of reunification with Germany. However, the 1919 Treaty of St. Germain forbade Anschluss, or reunification with Germany; if national self-determination ha d proceeded, Gemrany would have been bigger than before the war! In the end, Hitler marched in, to the triumphant cheers of the Austrians. Austrians are reluctant to admit this � a popular joke goes: Austrians tell two lies, that Beethoven was Austrian and Hitler was German.
The international community couldn�t do anything because both countries wanted it, and no one was willing to stick their necks in � this was an indication to Hitler that Europe would not say no to him. Hitler began to turn his dream of lebensraum into reality after his capture of Austria; next he would prepare to invade Czechoslovakia. Lebensraum was adopted from a German geographer circa 1898, and meant living space. Living space meant land beyond 1933 areas, which referred to all of Eastern Europe and then some. This came from the ridiculous idea that they were stuck in the middle of Europe; to change this, they wanted to establish a continuous empire, unlike Britain�s non-continuous empire. Within Czechoslovakia, Hitler aimed to get the Sudetenland, where the percentage of Germans went up to 90%. After World War I, the borders of Czechoslovakia had included the Sudetenland, as it made geographically sensible borders. Sensibly, the Czechs attempted to Czech-ify its land; Germans agitated against this imposition as a violation of rights. Berlin attempted to intercede and threatened war if the Sudeten Germans were not �rescued.� It was important to the Allies in one fashion: it was the only democratic state east of the Rhine. Still, France was unwilling to live up to its treaty and stop Germany, because it had to fight all of Germany to get to the Sudetenland. Oppositely, Russia, who already had a track record of fighting against Nazism, was both unwanted as a savior, and was unable to travel through Poland to get into Czechoslovakia. Poland had had bad experiences with Russia, and was unwilling to let the behemoth move its military through the country.
The Czechs stood firm during this time, even as Chamberlain scoffed at the British population�s preparations for war. It was astonishing that he would consider a war not a possibility, because London was a direct flight away from Prague � according to him, he didn�t want to join a war to protect a Czech�s right to teach Czech. In August 1938, Chamberlain flew to Germany three times to negotiate a peace. Hitler was annoyed at his visits, but came out for the better, as Chamberlain gave him everything he asked for. In September 1938, an international conference in Munich brought together Britain, France, Germany and Italy to talk about the problem; surprisingly, Russia and the Czechs were not invited. The decision was to give Sudetenland to the Germans, in return for Hitler�s word that this was his last territorial demand. With this ridiculous agreement, Chamberlain returned home a hero for preventing war, earning the right to stand on the balcony of Buckingham Palace with the king to wave to the people. Hitler was disappointed, as were coup planners, as the prevention of war had cut off his goals and their excuse to overthrow him. This was probably an unfortunate event. Later, when he invaded Poland in 1939, he did not accept British ambassadors, so they could not provide him with an excuse to take away his war.
In 1941, at the start of the war, Hitler articulated the Final Solution at the Wandsee Conference�. Etc.
After 1945, with the cession of trans-Carpaco-Ruthenia, the cordon sanitaire was broken and Russia had direct access to Czechoslovakia and the rest of Europe. The division of Germany then became a test of wills between the United States and Russia, with little attention paid to the plight of the German people. The West wanted to incorporate Germany into the Western economies as it was felt that a general European recovery needed German participation. Russia, however, wanted to see Germany subjugated so that it could pay for all the damages and never threaten Russia again. They weren�t interested in spreading international communism, as Stalin had already instituted �socialism in one country.� After negotiations at Yalta and the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Western nations didn�t think devastating reparations was a good idea, as that had not worked after World War I. The net result was a division of Germany into American, British, French and Russian zones of influence. During this time, it was popular to blame the leaders for this division but the political reality was that the game of influences would have been played no matter what.
Churchill rallied moral support for the Western side in 1946 by detailing an �Iron Curtain� that had fallen between West and East Europe, confirming a clear Eastern boundary of influence that harbored communism and other ill effects of Stalin�s government. Thus, the Cold War was born. What to do with Eastern Europe? Undermine it. The Social Democratic movement had been growing in the UK, France and Germany with the establishment of a Third Way platform, a kind of modified socialism. They suffered, however, after the Cold War craze came. The Christian Democrats rose in power in Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations as they were anti-socialist yet anti-materialist, with criticisms of both capitalism and communism. They emphasized a need for democracy based on Catholic social teachings, with a healthy dose of solidarity, to form a �social market economy.� As they were the most reliable anti-Soviet, pro-US party, they did win the Allies� support. In Italy, the CIA even sponsored the Christian Democrats covertly, helping Prime Minister de Gaspari into office.
In the West, the Federal Republic of Germany was born with a parliamentary government in 1945. It was divided into US, British and French zones. Konrad Adenauer, in 1949, won the first elections there as leader of the Christian Democratic Union. Other conservative groups had all been destroyed before the war or after, by having collaborated with the Nazis. Adenauer would rule as chancellor until 1963 when he stepped down. He was known then as Der Alte, or the Old Guy. In the East, the German Democratic Republic was led by Walter Ulbricht starting in 1949. He was a Communist official who was able to gain power when the Social Democrats won by an ingenious Russian move: they forced a merger of the Social Democrats and the Communists into the SED party. Both Ulbricht and Adenauer had been shaped by the Nazi years, and they fought in a passive way to spread the influence of their respective supporters. There was an active fight over control of the Ruhr, but mainly they remained passive, as if to look like they were all for German reunification.
West Germany practiced a policy of Westbindlung that saw the country aim for a closer alliance with the West for faster economic recovery. Another term, �das Abendland�, referred to the enlightenment of the West over the East. At the same time, West Germany supported reunification, but that was out of the question. Naturally, the East supported a division, so a reunification of the two Germany�s would have been problematic. Alliances with the West brought West Germany more immediate benefits. Life in East Germany, meanwhile, was harsh, and they had to pay for all of their economic recovery. In the Eighties, historians suggested that Adenauer should have practice a policy of neutralism to East Germany that would have bought West Germany more support from the West. West Germany bought itself moral redemption and legitimacy as the real Germany after it took up economic responsibility for the Holocaust and paid reparations to the Israel and various Jewish organizations representing survivors.
In 1947, the Marshall Plan was released, giving money to countries to rebuild their economies. The one condition was that they have an organization in which all the European states would collectively discuss their economic needs. This was done with the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), that included most European nations but Spain, because of its dictatorship. It excluded all the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1960, it expanded to include Canada and Japan under the new acronym OECD. The Brussels Pact was signed in 1948 by Great Britain, France and the Benelux nations, creating a Western European Union of military alliances that also looked forward to US involvement. This was the last straw for the Russians. They began a blockade of Berlin in June 1948 that attempted to establish a larger Russian presence, but Western airlifts of supplies to Berlin defeated this attempt. Russia did not want to get into war just yet and so withdrew.
Britain was able to persuade the US to be part of a bigger military alliance that included Italy, Canada, Denmark, and the Brussels Pact nations. This new organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in Paris, during1949. US involvement was key in forming a defense against Russia. The threat of nuclear attacks would be a sufficient deterrent. The idea of a supranational organization was also floated around, where member nations would surrender some sovereignty in return for increased stability. The Council of Europe came into being in 1949 as well, in Strasbourg. The one thing nobody wanted to bring up was the issue of German rearmament. However, the outbreak of the Korean War � an uncomfortable parallel of Communism versus democracy � brought the topic to the forefront. NATO had to respond, to show its difference from the League of Nations, and so it sent in troops under the command of Eisenhower.
Adenauer was willing to offer some support to NATO if Germany was allowed into NATO and also given some military leeway. In 1950, European nations, especially France, were concerned about rebuilding economically while also preserving their security, vis-�-vis Germany. To stabilize all their military fronts and keep West Germany in the fold, they offered it military leeway if it was a member of one big European army. This became so in 1952, when the European Defense Community pact was signed. The only members were France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux states, as Scandinavia and the British were wary of the commitment. It failed in 1954 when France backed out after public disapproval and concerns about overreaching with overseas commitments. Many of the states also did not want to give up sovereignty, and though the US was strongly backing the EDC and threatening reprisals if states didn�t follow through, the EDC fell apart. France was criticized for being selfish, Britain was criticized for not even joining at all, and ironically, only the Germans were enthusiastic about the project, on paper.
West Germany had chosen this option above Stalin�s offer of Germany neutrality and reunification if they didn�t join. However, by 1954, they were again stuck without a military. This was quickly solved. In 1955, West Germany was finally allowed to have an army of its own and join NATO, as well as have all occupation agreements were lifted. In return, they signed an agreement saying they would never make any atomic, biological or chemical weapons. The same year, the Warsaw Pact was announced, with signatories Russia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. This finalized the split between Western and Eastern Europe.
The next organization to be established was outlined in the Schuman plan, which introduced an alliance built on coal and steel that would help European development. The idea intrigued Konrad Adenauer, who joined Italy, France and the Benelux nations in signing the pact creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg. This was to become the core of the European Union. A draft proposal for a European Political Community (EPC) was drawn up in 1953 but never signed. Finally, in 1955, the Original Six met again in Messina to discuss the Spaak Report, on the development of a European Economic Community (EEC). This was set up under the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The intention was to build a common market that would be free of tariffs between member nations, with great short term economic cooperation. This further promoted a division within Western Europe at the same time that the Cold War division was most apparent.
Britain opposed the Common Market scheme and instead wanted a free trade zone similar to NAFTA. With Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, Britain started up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959. With this polarized group, it was the evident power. The debate with the EEC grew heated over the 1960s. The US looked on the battle of the Six and Seven with disdain. Kennedy envisioned an Atlantic Organization with the US as leader, that had all of Europe in alliance with full integration. Since de Gaulle had come to power in France (after his Fourth Republic had failed and then subsequently, parliamentary democracy did too), he wanted to establish France�s power. It suited him that Britain stayed out, as France could be the main power in the EEC in front of a weakened Germany. It eventually grew in power as the ECSC was folded into it.