A Crisis in Europe
The decade after the end of the Great War was characterized not only by desperate attempts to stabilize the peace of Europe by the Allies and moderate elements in Germany, but by a deepening crisis � apparent in the frequent outbursts of radical sentiment and rebellion against the culture of the old. World War I had engendered a growing sense of despair in the state of mankind. Both the tattered civilian population and the army corps suffered a great disillusionment in the ability of European society to undo its wrongs and justify the decadence that had led to total war and what was seen as the decay of civilization. In response, popular movements took charge over archaic structures in all areas of human interaction. The subsequent disorder in transition created a distinct imbalance � between debtor and creditor nations, between victor and vanquished, as well as between supposed allies � that required resolutions not forthcoming until later decades.
Before the Great War, European citizens had taken it for granted that their nations and culture were at the height of civilization; afterwards, many were not quite sure. Paul Valery noted in his essay �Crisis of the Mind� that although European domination had been the case for many centuries, this was actually �an extraordinary upset in equilibrium� which would �allow us to foresee a gradual change in the opposite direction� (Valery). However, it was not the gradual disappearance of European technical mastery that most inclined toward this end, but the general social apathy and mistrust in politics generated by the prolonging of such a senseless war. Many mourned the excessive waste of life during the war: �[Abraham] would not [offer the Ram of Pride], but slew his son, and half the seed of Europe, one by one� (Owen, �Parable�). Wilfrid Owen, in another war poem, commented on the �great lie [of] dulce decorum est,� the patriotic slogan broadcast to the British under the rule of Sir Herbert Asquith and later David Lloyd George (Owen, �Dulce�). On both sides of the war, people noted that the reasons for war had depended less on their needs than on foolish political games: �I see the keenest brains of the world invent weapons and words to make [the war] yet more refined and enduring� (Remarque). Perhaps it was more bitter for the soldiers who returned home to a population that did not understand the reasons for such a war; it was akin to a betrayal.
The Russian population had already responded to the inadequacy of monarchist excuses for continuing the war: a violent revolution provided them with an outlet to address the national losses in manpower, resources and land. Finding their provisional government unsuitable, Russians wholly turned to communism under the leadership of Lenin. Under the Bolsheviks, Russia was able to negotiate peace and appease its people using a philosophy of class equality. However, this growth in Russian stability created a critical tension in relations with other European states, their supposed allies. In 1920, the Communist International, which regulated Russian policy and that of communist parties in other nations, proclaimed that its task was to �liberate the working people of the entire world� (Gilbert 184). As the power of most Western European states was based on their colonial empires, this attempt to inspire and prolong native independence movements presented a serious attack on their positions. This was not an idle threat either: communist revolutions had broken out in parts of Eastern Europe and Germany, as many saw liberalism and democracy as failing forces. Though Russia was to abandon world revolution in favor of �socialism within one country,� Russian influence was undeniable, and this conflict with Western systems would build in intensity until its resolution at the end of the Cold War, seven decades later (Gilbert 220).
The Paris Peace Conference introduced Western efforts to deal with the influence of Soviet Russia as well as with intransigent Germany. Its goals were two-fold: to prevent Germany from waging war again, and to establish �a cordon sanitaire which would separate Bolshevik Russia from the democratic states� (Gilbert 185). The settlement very frequently adopted stances that seemed not only spiteful and unfair, but which opposed the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination and open diplomacy (Keylor 481). The indignation of the American and British press at the veil of secrecy over the proceedings probably increased the overall negative effect of the conference. Often, secret negotiations came to light in embarrassing public episodes that in the end contributed to the treaty�s rejection by the American Senate (Del Gallo). Though the diplomatic arrangements during the conference were evidently in disagreement with the moral basis by which the Western powers had entered and continued the war, it was a necessary truce, due to the rising conflict between British and French aims. The British wanted to limit the terms of the treaty to prevent Germany siding with Russia, but they had to make concessions to the French, who demanded harsher measures on account of their own economic hardship (Gilbert 168).
Internationally, the treaties appeared unjust as they seemed to punish civilians more than it did their belligerent governments. To the Germans, it appeared even more so, for the high reparations, limitation of army size and permanent demilitarization and occupation of the Ruhr would extend crippling blows to an already stagnant economy. German anger was aimed at the Allies and at the Weimar government, who had signed the treaties in representation of the German people; it became manifest in unrest and assassinations of important German politicians involved in fulfillment. Putsches attempted to wrest control of the government in favor of obstructionist policies, as many felt the international community would not be able to enforce any of the demands of the Versailles treaty (Gilbert 187). Though the military was successful in putting down the rebellions, the possibility still existed that enforcement of treaty demands would not be forthcoming, as Britain and France were feuding and most nations did not take Wilson�s League of Nations seriously as a deterrent.
Germany continued using a policy of fulfillment of the terms of the Versailles treaty, under the chancellorship of Gustav Stresemann. A practical moderate, Stresemann was able to please the Allies while dealing with the recalcitrant German population, enabling him to negotiate brilliantly on Germany�s behalf at Locarno in 1925. In return for agreeing to keep the western boundaries permanent, Stresemann was able to move back the Allied withdrawal date, further build up the army against treaty limitations, and win support in establishing eastern boundaries in Germany�s favor (Thimme 77). However beneficial the Locarno treaty was for the political and military strength of the nation, it did not completely appease the German people�s sense of insulted national pride. The seeds of discontent remained, leaving the way open for rabid nationalism as practiced by the Nazi party in the 1930�s; this was in opposition to the traditional balance of power within Europe.
The economic status of Europe moved to even shakier ground as Germany was added to the list of debtor nations to the United States, which had become the world�s largest creditor. The Dawes Plan, negotiated by American bankers, allowed Germany to organize the payment of reparations on a fixed scale with the help of large loans based in New York banks. Though the Dawes Plan stabilized German currency, lowered unemployment and brought inflation under control, many Germans were opposed to foreign management of the German economy (�Dawes Plan�). In any case, it did not matter for very long.
Rampant speculation in the confident, flush post-war rebuilding economy proved fatal in 1929, when the stock market crash caused the collapse of the American economy. As most European nations were tied financially to the United States, it proved disastrous for European economies as well. The lack of money caused a lowering in trade, wages, employment and mass bankruptcies, causing resentment as a method of spreading blame. In addition, it caused great physical trouble to small nations who relied on agriculture; when no one could buy, there was no cash flow whatsoever. Unsurprisingly, Germany�s staggering reparation debts were soon cancelled � no one expected repayment during such bleak times (Gilbert 226). The after-effects of the crash extended well into the next decade, leaving a trail of enmity against those who were seen as the cause of the crash; this became a focal point in Germany before the Second World War.
By the end of the 1920�s, it was evident that Europe had not healed from the ravages of the Great War, and was experiencing an intensifying crisis. The end of the war had generated an apathy toward government and politics that was evident in the writings of the soldiers and survivors returning from the atrocities of the war. The combination of economic hardship, feelings of vengeance and fear of the communist ideology from allied Russia caused the settling of a peace on Europe that not only undermined the moral basis from which the Allies had won the war, but created new resentments which could not be resolved. The enmity and suffering of the time were further exacerbated by the economic devastation wrought by the Stock Market Crash. It seemed that the 1920�s had ended on a lower note than did the war: for this time, there were no victors, only vanquished.
Del Gallo, Dino. �The Press and the Paris Peace Conference.� 2002. http://www.nv.cc.va.us/home/cevans/Versailles/papers/Delgallo/Paper.html (5 Feb. 2004)
Gilbert, Felix and David Clay Large. The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002.
Keylor, William R. �Versailles and International Diplomacy.� The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Eds. Boemeke, Manfred, Gerald Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Owen, Wilfrid. �The Parable of the Old Man and the Young.� 1999. http://www.hcu.ox.ac.uk/jtap/warpoems.htm#5 (5 Feb. 2004)
Owen, Wilfrid. �Dolce Et Decorum Est.� 1999. http://www.hcu.ox.ac.uk/jtap/warpoems.htm#12 (5 Feb. 2004)
Remarque, Erich Maria. �All Quiet on the Western Front.� Interactions Book Blog. 2003. http://www.brooklyninternational.org/weblogs/books/archives/000007.html (5 Feb. 2004)
�The Dawes Plan.� 2004. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERdawes.htm (5 Feb. 2004)
Thimme, Annelise. �Stresemann and Locarno.� European Diplomacy Between Two Wars: 1919-1939. Ed. Gatzke, Hans. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972.
Valery, Paul. �Crisis of the Mind.� The History Guide. 2003. http://www.historyguide.org/europe/valery.html (5 Feb. 2004)